o
Pl - Cullip
o
Df - Domann
What happened?
o
The plaintiff, David Cullip, age 14, and two friends the same age, the
defendants Johnny Jack Mercer (J.J.) and William Domann, went
hunting on property not owned by them.
o
A 12-gauge shotgun carried by William accidentally discharged, striking
the plaintiff and causing permanent paralysis.
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After discovery and partial settlement with other named defendants, the
trial court granted summary judgment to J.J. and his parents,
Joe and LuElla Mercer, on all of the plaintiff's negligence
claims.
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The plaintiff appeals and we affirm. |
Pl - Arguments
1.
J.J.'s failure to take a hunter safety
course as required by K.S.A. 32-920 is
negligence per se,
subjecting J.J. to liability for the plaintiff's injury and
damages.
2.
The plaintiff also argues that
liability may be predicated upon a joint venture
giving rise to the duty of each member of the hunting party to
insure that proper safety precautions were followed by all
members of the joint venture.
T.Ct Arg 1
o
JJs alleged violation of not taking hunters safety was not he
proximate cause of the Pl - injury.
T.Ct Arg 2
o
The relational hunting party in this case may not be considered a joint
venture.
Joint Venture
o
A joint venture occurs where two or more persons combine to
engage in a single business enterprise for
profit, such that
liability is imputed to all
participants.
Element to
Establish Joint Venture Liability
(1) an
agreement;
(2) a common
purpose;
(3) a community
of interest; and
(4) an equal
right to a voice accompanied by an
equal right of control
over the
instrumentality causing the injury
Distinction
between Joint Enterprise and Joint Ventures
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Joint Ventures apply to business ventures.
o
Joint Enterprises do NOT apply to business ventures.
Elements of a
Joint Enterprise
(1) an
agreement,
(2) a common
purpose,
(3) a community
of interest, and
(4) an equal
right to a voice, accompanied by an equal right of control over
the
Instrumentality
Scott Case
Passenger of a car.
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This court held that in situations where the passenger and driver were
engaged in a joint enterprise, the passenger
could be held liable to third persons for the negligence of
the driver.
Supreme Court
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Joint enterprise does not exist.
Delgado
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Minnesota Supreme Court stated that as a matter of law, the hunters
were not engaged in a joint enterprise because they
were engaged in a
recreational activity on a gratuitous and
voluntary basis with no
sharing of expenses or equipment, and, more
importantly, each hunter
had control of his or her own gun
Rule
o
Where evidence of the relationship and understanding of the parties is
undisputed and the facts and circumstances
clearly show a passenger
[alleged participant in a joint enterprise]
does not have an equal
privilege and right to control . . . the issue of joint
enterprise to support vicarious liability becomes one of law for
the court's determination.
Joint
Enterprise Problem
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A joint enterprise does not establish a duty of care between its
members.
Joint Venture
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Has been held to impose a duty on all its member to engage in a full,
fair, open and honest disclosure of everything affecting the
business relationship.
Thus, even if
the plaintiff could have established a joint enterprise, he
cannot establish that such a relationship creates a duty among
and to the members of the joint enterprise.
Vetter
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The driver of a van and his passenger intentionally verbally assaulted
and swerved toward the plaintiff, causing an accident.
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In discussing the liability of the passenger, the Court of Appeals
found that one person may be
liable for the tortious conduct of another when they
act in concert
pursuant to a common design.
Liability for
Acting in a concerted Manner
'"For harm
resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of
another, one is subject to liability if he
(a) does a
tortious act in concert with the other
or pursuant to a common design with him, or
(b) knows
that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty
and gives substantial assistance or
encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives
substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious
result and his own conduct, separately considered,
constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.'"
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